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One Size Does Not Fit All: The
Third Multi-Track Restatement
of Conflict of Laws
AARON D. TWERSKI
INTRODUCTION
We simply can't agree. Any attempt to draft a traditional third restatement of
conflicts will quickly deteriorate into irreconcilable conflict between academicians,
judges, and members of the bar who favor one or another approach to choice of law.
In order to draft a traditional restatement, one must sense a general consensus about
fundamental issues. When consensus is lacking, the effort is bound to fail. However,
the American Law Institute ("ALl") has developed a method for dealing with
irreconcilable conflict and writing a successful, nontraditional multi-track
restatement. The author was co-reporter of a traditional consensus Restatement' and
an interested observer to a very nontraditional Restatement in an area where
consensus could not be found.2 From the vantage point of a reporter, I believe that to
attempt the former will fail for conflict of laws but that a multi-track restatement of
conflicts of laws could succeed and make a valuable contribution to the clarity of
judicial decisionmaking in this contentious and troubled area of the law. This Article
will briefly describe the traditional and nontraditional models. It will then argue that
the non-traditional model will be a vast improvement over the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws3 ("Second Restatement").
1. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT-THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
In 1992, the author was appointed co-reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability together with Professor James A. Henderson, Jr. In May 1997,
after five grueling years, the ALI approved the Restatement at its annual meeting.'
The previous Restatement of the law of products liability was embodied in one
section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The now famous section 402A imposed
strict tort liability for the sale of defective products and laid to rest for all time the
canard of privity that blocked plaintiffs from bringing direct actions against product
* Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth Medrash
Elyon Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D., 1965,
Marquette University.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD): PRODS. LIAB.].
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (Proposed Final Draft
1999) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT]. The Draft was adopted by the
American Law Institute on May 18, 1999, subject to changes suggested at the Annual Meeting.
See American Law Institute, Actions Taken at 1999 Annual Meeting (last visited Dec. 17,
1999) <http://www.ali.org/ali/1999_ActionsSum.htm>.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
4. The Proposed Final Draft was approved on May 20, 1997, by the membership of the
ALI and published in final form after incorporating minor changes mandated by the
membership at that meeting.
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manufacturers.5 The implied warranty of merchantability (contractual strict liability)
action was laden with too much UCC baggage to be an effective remedy for classic
personal injury litigation.6 In very short order, strict tort liability for defective
products swept the country.7 It became the all-time winner as the most cited
Restatement section in the history of the American Law Institute.!
For all its vaunted success, section 402A was clearly inadequate for the burgeoning
field of products liability. It did not address design defect liability at all and spoke to
failure-to-warn only obliquely.9 Both of these fields were in their infancy when
section 402A was drafted. Its discussion of liability for defective drugs was muddled
and confused.'° The entire field of crashworthiness litigation antedates section 402A
and thus was not mentioned at all." The rules governing component part
manufacturers are captured in one paragraph and do not begin to deal with the
subtleties arising from this genre of products. 2 Postsale duties to warn were almost
two decades in coming. 3 The discussion of plaintiff fault in section 402A was mired
in the now outdated rule of contributory fault as a complete bar.' 4 And the list goes
on. There was a desperate need for a new restatement. 5
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
6. See id. § 402A cmt. m.
7. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 165 (3d ed. 1996).
8. See Letter from Marianne M. Walker, ALI Restatement Case Citations Editor, to Aaron
D. Twerski and James A. Henderson, Jr. (Oct. II, 1991) (on file with author) ("In my nine
years with the American Law Institute I have found Section 402A to be the most frequently
cited section of any Restatement.")
9. Neither the black letter or comments to § 402A discuss liability for defective design.
See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 880 (1998) ("The simple truth is that liability for
defective design was in its nascent stages in the early 1960s and Section 402 did not address
it meaningfully, if at all."); George L. Priest, Strict Product Liability: The Original Intent, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301 passim (1989). The only reference to failure to warn is found in
section 402A, comments j and k. These comments are among the most troublesome in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and have been radically altered in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.
10. Section 402A comment k is widely acknowledged to be poorly drafted and almost
unfathomable. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Willa New Restatement Help
Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (1993).
11. The lead case establishing crashworthiness liability, Larsen v. GeneralMotors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), was not decided until three years after the publication of section
402A.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 402A cmt. q. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts deals with the issues in comprehensive fashion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD):
PRODS. LIAB., supra note 1, § 5.
13. Only one pre-section 402A case discussed postsale failure to wilm. See Comstock v.
General Motors Co., 99N.W.2d 627,634 (Mich. 1959). Not until Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d
864, 871 (N.Y. 1984), did this theory become a real weapon in the plaintiff s arsenal.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 402A cmt. n.
15. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues that supported the drafting of a new
products liability restatement, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512,
1526-29 (1992). This article was drafted before the authors were appointed as reporters for the
[Vol. 75:667
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As with most restatements, we had choices to make between majority and minority
rules and we did so. 6 Where section 402A made unfortunate policy choices, we
rejected them.' 7 And where the case law was so muddled and confused that no one
could divine what the courts were saying, we sought to make sense out of what was
going on and reformulate the law in a sensible and logical fashion.' One major
controversy surfaced within the project and that dealt with the standard of liability for
defective product design.'9 Our reading of the case law led us to the conclusion that
the general rule required that plaintiffs prove a reasonable alternative design in most
cases in order to establish a case for designs defect. Most courts view risk-utility
balancing as the doctrinal base for deciding design cases.2' This test imposes liability
when an alternative to an existing design could have been adopted that would have
avoided a reduced injury at acceptable cost.2'
Opponents sought to convince the AL that it ought to adopt a test that allowed a
product to be found defective if it failed to meet consumer expectations.22 The
consumer expectations test had been rejected as an acceptable test for defect in a large
number ofjurisdictions. 3 We were able to demonstrate that even courts that utilized
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD): PROD. LIAB., supra note 1, § 16. The authors chose
the Fox-Mitchell rule imposingjoint liability on tortfeasors when the plaintiff cannot establish
the extent of the aggravation caused by the defective product and rejected the Huddell rule. See
id. § 16, reporter's note at 243-52. For a discussion of the Fox-Mitchell and Huddell rules, see
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability
Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667, 692-94 & nn.69-73 (1998).
17. For example, section 402A, commentj stated that, "Where warning is given, the seller
may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning,
which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 5, § 404A cmt. j. This section
came under scathing attack from Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products and
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1994); see also James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell ofFailure
To Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 278-79 (1990).
18. As noted supra note 9, the law with regard to defective drugs as set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A comment k was in serious need of total overhaul.
The new product liability restatement in section 6 sets forth a totally new formulation of
liability for this special product area. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD): PRODS. LIAB., supra note
1, § 6.
19. See Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 9, at 876-87 (chronicling the debate on the
appropriate standard for design defect liability); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15, at 672-
86.
20. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 887; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15,
at 672 n. 11.
21. For an exhaustive listing of authority, see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15, at 672
n.11.
22. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 665-68 (1995).
23. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 15, at 672; see also Armentrout v. FMC Corp.,
842 P.2d 175,185 (Colo. 1992); Prentisv. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich. 1984);
Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982); Turner v. General Motors Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (codifying this approach in Texas in TEX. Civ. PRAC. REMEDIES
2000]
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the consumer expectations test were utilizing the test in a very limited set of cases,24
but generally risk-utility balancing had won the overwhelming allegiance of the
courts throughout the country.25 We further noted that courts often spoke of consumer
expectations but when one dug a bit deeper and analyzed the opinions, the courts
were in fact performing risk-utility analysis.26
This process of carefully parsing the case law and getting behind the facade of
linguistics is the classic role of restatements. In doing so, we were able to discover a
remarkable consensus throughout the country as to the governing standard for design
defect liability.2 7 Furthermore, the leading academics concurred in our analysis.28
Admittedly, there were some naysayers.2 9 And partisan advocates on the plaintiffs
side sought to portray the judicial landscape as more fluid and open to a formless
liability standard." Their efforts were for nought. The ALl Council, consisting of
sixty leading academics, judges and lawyers, sensed that we had cut through the
verbiage and identified the liability standard correctly. The Council is the governing
CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 1997)).
24. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 872-76, 889-90; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD): PRODS. LIAB., supra note 1, § 3, note at 115-18.
25. See supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978)
("'The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer ... ') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.
i). "Proof of unreasonableness involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the
utility of the product and on the other is the risk of its use." Id. at 835.
27. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 9, at 893-901.
28. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 149, 644 (4th ed.
1971) (defining the standard of conduct in negligence as a balancing of "the risk, ....
probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking
to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued" and writing that in the area of design
defect a manufacturer's liability appears to be "essentially a matter of negligence"); W. Page
Keeton, Products Liability---Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV.
293, 313 (1979) (proposing that a product be determined defectively designed "if a reasonable
person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger ... outweighs the utility of the
design"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 553-43 (1985) (endorsing use of risk-utility analysis in
design defect cases); David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 239,239 (1997) ("Courts and commentators increasingly comprehend that
ascertaining design defectiveness in products liability cases requires some kind of'risk-utility'
balancing."); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV.
435, 464 (1979) ("There can be little doubt about the correctness of the risk-benefit standard
for design defect .... ); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (listing factors to be balanced in a risk-utility analysis.)
29. See Shapo, supra note 22, at 665-68; see also, Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the
Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third):
Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994); Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer
Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actionsfor Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN.
L. REV. 1189 (1994).
30. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns
a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defect-A Survey of the States
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 553 (1996).
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body of the Institute that reviews and approves all tentative drafts before they are sent
to the entire membership for adoption. The membership concurred in theirjudgment.
Not only was it the rule, it was the only approach that made good sense.
II.THE NONTRADITIONAL MODEL-
THE APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT
In 1993, Professors William Powers and Michael Green began work on the
Restatement of Apportionment. They faced the unenviable task of working out the
rules for apportionment of fault and causation, not only between plaintiffs and
defendants, but between defendants intra se. They immediately faced the dilemma
of how to deal with the issue ofjoint and several tort liability. With the advent of
comparative fault, courts were routinely assigning proportional fault in contribution
actions between defendants." It was not long before the defendants successfully
argued to state legislatures32 and courts33 that once fault was apportioned, no
defendants should bear more than their share of the fault.
Where all defendants are solvent, the issue is of no moment. When they are not, the
major issue is who should bear the share of the insolvent or immune defendant's
responsibility. 4 Those arguing for several liability argued that it was unfair for any
defendant to bear more than their share ofthe fault.3" If another defendant whose fault
could be determined was insolvent, it was the plaintiffs problem. Those arguing for
the retention of the common-law joint and several doctrine, contend that though fault
was apportionable, an innocent plaintiff, whose injury was brought about through the
causal contribution of two or more defendants, should not bear the loss of an
insolvent defendant whose negligence causally contributed to the plaintiff's injury.36
The solvent defendant whose fault was causal should bear the burden ofthe insolvent
defendant.
The law throughout the country was sharply divided. Some sixteen jurisdictions
retained the common-lawjoint and several rule." Approximately fourteen states have
opted for several liability exclusively.38 A goodly number of states allow joint and
31. For a discussion setting forth the statutory and judicial development of the rule
requiring contribution based on proportional fault, see VICTOR E. SCHwARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ch. 16 (3d ed. 1994).
32. For a discussion of the legislative initiatives to abolish the common-law joint and
several liability doctrine, see Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A
Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1125, 1131-33 (1989); Richard W.
Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of
Joint and Several Liabilityfor Actual Harm andRiskExposure, 21 U. C. DAVIS L.REV. 1141,
1164-68 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App.
1982); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
34. See RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 2, § 20 cmt. b.
35. See Twerski, supra note 32, at 1130 & nn.17-18.
36. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 32, at 1186.
37. See RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 2, § 28A cmt. a reporters' notes.
38. See id § 28B cmt. b reporters' note.
2000]
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several liability only if a defendant's fault exceeds some percentage threshold. 9
Others apply joint and several liability to economic loss but several liability only to
non-economic loss. 4 0 Finally, a cadre of states apportion the share of the insolvent
defendants' fault among all of the parties to the action according to their percentage
of fault.4 Thus, not only defendants, but also a plaintiff who is at fault, bears her
proportional share of the loss brought about by the insolvent defendant.
The Reporters Powers and Green had their own view of the fairest solution to the
problem. They would have opted for one of the hybrid solutions rather than either
retention or rejection ofjoint and several liability.4 However, it is clear, that given
the irreconcilable differences between the jurisdictions, consensus could not be
reached.
The American Law Institute wisely chose to be agnostic as to which system was
preferable and instead opted for a multi-track restatement.43 The Restatement of
Apportionment describes the five tracks and then undertakes the important task of
deciding how each of the systems should be fairly administered.' What factors
should be considered in apportioning fault? 5 How should courts deal with the fault
of nonparties to the action?46 Should the fault of a negligent tortfeasor whose
responsibility is to prevent the occurrence of an intentional tort be apportioned? 7
How or whether to apportion fault between the negligent and intentional tortfeasors
is of great significance in cases where a hotel or an office building breaches its duty
to provide security in order to prevent thieves and rapists from entering the
establishment and injuring patrons. If fault apportionment is allowed in these cases,
the negligent tortfeasor might pay little or nothing in any system that is notjoint and
several. A jury would likely apportion the lion's share of the fault to the intentional
tortfeasor. Under a theory of several liability, the plaintiff would be relegated to
recovering only a small percentage of her losses from the tortfeasor who had the
responsibility of assuring that the unwelcome entrant be prevented from entering the
premises.48 In short, even in a multi-track restatement, there is much work to be done
to ensure that the law under each respective system is internally consistent with its
own governing principles and provides the greatest degree of fairness given the
inherent limitations of the system.
39. See id. § 28D cmt. c reporters' note.
40. See id. § 29E cmt. b reporters' note.
41. See id. § 28C cmt. a reporters' note.
42. See id. § 20 cmt. a.
43. See id. § 20 cmt. a.
44. Id. §§ 28A-28D.
45. See id. § 8.
46. See id. §§ 29B cmts. c, d, e & f, 29C cmt. e; 29D cmt. e; 29E cmts. e & f.
47. See id. § 24.
48. See id. § 24 cmt. b.
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III. A MULTI-TRACK RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Though there is much disagreement as to how to resolve many choice-of-law
issues, there are matters on which there is little disagreement. No modem-day
conflicts scholar advocates returning to the rigid jurisdiction-selecting rules of the
Restatement ofthe Law ofConflict ofLaws ("First Restatement").49 Furthermore, few,
if any, express any real enthusiasm for the SecondRestatement 0 Even admitting that
courts who utilize the Second Restatement often get the right results, the cases are
poorly reasoned and provide no predictability to counsel as to how the court would
resolve cases in the future. For starters, a new restatement could begin by rejecting
both the First and Second Restatement as adequate analytical tools for resolving
choice-of-law problems.
It should then identify the major academic currents in the policy-centered approach
to choice of law. Candidates for inclusion include the following:
A. Classic Interest Analysis
The pathbreaking work done by Brainerd Currie in the 1960s continues to retain
an impressive group of devotees who believe that Currie was correct.' In Currie's
view conflict of laws is simply not a legitimate subject.52 The universe consists of
49. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT]. Neither of the two most extreme territorialists among the modem-day writers
is prepared to embrace FirstRestatementjurisdiction-selecting rules without qualification. See
Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 1585, 1636-46
(1985). The author has set forth his territorialist bias in a series of articles and does not
advocate a return to First Restatement territorialism. See Aaron D. Twerski, Enlightened
Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 385,
390 (1971).
50. The disdain for Second Restatement "contact-counting" has been so oft repeated that
it hardly warrants citation. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRUAB, COMMENTARY ONTHE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (3d ed. 1986); Larry Kramer, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1990: Trends
and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466, 486-89 (1991) ("[O]ne needs to read a lot
of opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate just how badly the Second Restatement works
in practice.... [i]t is time to abandon this dead-end project in order to channel judges in more
productive directions."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying
to be all things to all people, it produced mush."); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69
B.U. L. REv. 1, 77 (1989) ("[S]ilence regarding the priority of [Section 6(a)] policies mystifies
rather than clarifies.").
5 1. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, A Defense ofCurrie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215
REcuEIL DES COuRs 9 (1989); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: InterestAnalysis and Its "New
Crits", 36 AM. J. COME. L. 681 (1988); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference in the Conflict ofLaws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34 MERCERL. REv. 593
(1983); Louise Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475
(2000).
52. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study of Conflict-of-Laws
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 77, 117 (1963).
2000]
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false conflict cases in which every state confronted with the alleged conflict should
find that the law of the only interested jurisdiction applies.5 3 Where each state can lay
claim to a legitimate state interest, the conflict is real and cannot be resolved by
choice-of-law theory. 4 Faced with a true conflict, a state is duty-bound to foster its
own interest by applying its law. 5 Currie acknowledged a class of cases where no
state has any legitimate interests to foster. In such unprovided for cases the default
rule is that the forum applies its own law. 6 Admittedly, Currie allowed for a state to
engage in a moderate and restrained interpretation of its own law to discern whether
it had a legitimate interest, 7 but for Currie this was an exercise in domestic
lawmaking, not an attempt to engage in the forbidden task of working out a sensible
allocation of lawmaking authority between states in situations in which the facts
straddled several state lines. 8 At bottom the Currie approach is premised on a state's
interest in favoring its own domiciliaries and an abiding belief that in the absence of
direction from Congress, states have no business in choosing between the laws of
interested jurisdictions.59
The task for the advocates of a third restatement of conflicts would be to delineate
what interests qualify as legitimate expressions of state policy concerns' and which
are nothing more than unconscionable grabs for power6 or blatant attempts to utilize
conflicts law to accomplish justice in the individual case, irrespective of whether a
state had a legitimate interest.62 One would expect that the Currieites would marshal
considerable authority from existing case law to demonstrate that courts have, in fact,
been faithful to the Currie approach.63 Restaters have an obligation to get behind the
53. See id. at 107.
54. See id. at 119; Sedler, supra note 51, at 595.
55. See CURRIE, supra note 52, at 119.
56. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 52, at 128,
152-56.
57. See id. at 153-56. For an interesting analysis of the unprovided for case challenging the
premise that no such category exists, see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-For"
Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963).
59. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Conflict, Crisis, and Confusion in New York, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 52, at 690, 718.
60. This issue will require substantial attention. See, e.g., Symposium, Choice ofLaw: How
It Ought To Be, 48 MERCER L. REV. 639, 674-88 (1997) (transcript of roundtable discussion)
(noting significant disagreement as to whether in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480
N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985), New York has an interest in applying its law or whether the case
presented a false conflict).
61. See, e.g, Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 392 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Minn. 1973).
63. In a series of articles, Professor Robert Sedler has marshalled authority in support of
interest analysis and has reduced his findings to what he calls "rule of choice of law." See, e.g.,
Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Conflicts Tort Cases: A Third Restatement or Rules of
Choice of Law, 75 IND. L.J. 615, 619-33 (2000); Robert A. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law
Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Tort Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975,
[Vol. 75:667
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rhetoric and demonstrate that, the rhetoric notwithstanding, the actual holdings of the
court are best explained by the Currie principles.
B. The Neo-Territorialists
The father of the neo-territorialist approach to choice of law is David Cavers. In his
book, The Choice of Law Process,' and a host of articles65 Cavers took issue with
Brainerd Currie. Cavers agreed with the fundamental thrust of a policy-oriented
approach to choice of law. Indeed, one of his early articles was highly influential in
demonstrating the folly of policy-blind jurisdiction-selecting rules.' However, the
neo-territorialists are not ready.to accede to the notion that courts have no business
looking beyond their own states' interests.67 And they are clearly not satisfied with
the heavy emphasis on states interests in their own domiciliaries as the lynchpin on
which to base their policy-oriented approach.68 Once one abandons the two
fundamental tenets of Currie Interest Analysis, the impetus to adopt a territorial
perspective is powerful. For some a territorialist bias runs very deep and has its basis
in the respect that sovereign states must have for each other in recognizing their right
to govern events within their borders.69 For others it is fueled by serious constitutional
antidiscrimination concerns.7" Whatever the source, there exists a deep skepticism
among a strong contingent of scholars as to the Currie approach and a concomitant
flight to territorialism, albeit not mindlessjurisdiction-selecting rules, as the preferred
approach to choice of law.
994-1040 (1977).
64. DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 73-75 (1965).
65. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts Justice, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 360, 369-70
(1971); David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice of Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 734 n.9 (1963).
66. See David F. Cavers, A Critique ofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173
(1933).
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Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, andSelf-Determination, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 261, 314-32 (1987); Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the
Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 119-29 (1981).
68. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICTOF LAWS § 2.1.2 (2d ed. 1995); Ely, supra note
67, at 174-75.
69. See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 49, at 384-85, 390; Aaron D. Twerski, On Territoriality
and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice, 10 HOFsTRA L. REV. 149, 161-62
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In a new restatement the territorialists would be challenged to delineate where
policy concerns end and where territorial concerns begin. Territorialists (myself
included) have had a devil of a time explaining how it is that territorialist principles
are so important to the resolution of coiflicts cases yet are not sufficient to create
interests, in and of themselves.7" And once one abandons the rigid territorialist rules
of the First Restatement, fashioning more sophisticated territorial doctrine will be no
picnic.72 The devil will be in the details, and it remains to be seen whether the task
can be accomplished.
C. Better Rule and Justice in the Individual Case
Though both the interest analysts and the territorialists believe that the "better law"
approach championed by Judge Leflar73 is not appropriate for deciding choice-of-law
cases,74 the view has its adherents both in the academy75 and in the courts. 76 It may
well deserve recognition as a separate track in a new restatement of conflicts.
Adherents of the Leflar approach will have a more difficult time of it than did
Leflar himself. As others have noted, in the early days of conflicts the "better law"
approach was utilized by a forum to unshackle itself from its own anachronistic rules
that had long become obsolete but hung on because of legislative indifference.77 In
the brave new world of tort reform, the courts flirting with the "better law" approach
will be confronting legislative mandates whose ink has yet to dry. Many of the rules
may well be distasteful to courts who find them substantively unjust or too rigid and
in any event an incursion on traditional lawmaking of common law courts. A
conflicts case might provide an opportunity to give the legislature the proverbial
71. See CAVERS, supra note 64, at 166-76 (1965) (applying his fourth principle of
preference, a territorial principle to govern a case that would otherwise be a false conflict and
to support the holding of Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965)); see also Aaron D.
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 104,
123-24 (1973).
72. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 322-3 1.
73. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 267, 295-304 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
74. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 50, § 6.27; BRILMAYER, supra note 68, § 2.2.3; see
also CAVERS, supra note 64, at 75-81.
75. See, e.g., Robert L. Felix, Leflar in the Courts: Judicial Adoptions of Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 52 ARK. L. REV. 35, 121 (1999); William L. Reynolds& William
M. Richman, Robert Leflar, Judicial Process and Choice-of-Law, 52 ARK. L. REV. 123, 139-
40 (1999); see also Singer, supra note 50, at 75.
76. See Felix, supra note 75, at 46 nn.32-33 (listing Arkansas, Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie
Co., 550 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. 1977); Minnesota, Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn.
1973); New Hampshire, Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Rhode Island, Woodward
v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968); and Wisconsin, Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664 (Wis.
1967), as jurisdictions which have applied choice-influencing considerations to tort conflicts,
and Minnesota, Hime v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 284 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1979), and
Wisconsin, Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 177 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1970), as jurisdictions
which have done so to contract conflicts).
77. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 50, § 6.27.
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"kick in the pants." How to deal with this phenomenon will require straight-talking
by the Leflarites.
The suggestions for three categories are illustrative. Others may be able to define
some other discreet approaches that deserve working out in a new conflicts
restatement. What would be unworkable would be to have a restatement that reflects
the nuances of the host of scholars who have written so ably in this fascinating field
of law. Ultimately the politics of lawmaking will require academicians to recognize
the value of delineating a principled approach that captures the essence of the
theoretical approach they espouse. If this cannot be done the enterprise will fail.
Parenthetically, I believe this to be true about every restatement that has or will be
written. Nuances can be reflected in the comments, and often that must be done in a
tentative fashion so that they are not read as imperative. But no restatement can serve
a useful purpose unless it can successfully bring together like-minded adherents to
one view or another.
IV. SOME ANCILLARY QUESTIONS
If agreement could be reached on the usefulness of a multi-track conflicts
restatement there would be a need to decide how a new restatement should deal with
different subject matter categories. Should the divisions of subject matters (for
example, torts, contracts, property, decedent's estates, corporations) be continued
with or should they be dealt with only illustratively under the aegis of the theoretical
approaches to choice of law. Here there will likely be considerable dissonance
between the law in the courts and the law as the academicians would like it to be.
Furthermore, respected scholars have suggested a separate set of rules for
subspecialty fields such as products liability.7 These separate rules often reflect a
plaintiff bias and might run into considerable opposition from business groups who
would view them as seriously undermining gains they believe to have been made in
the legislative arena.
V. CONCLUSION
From the vantage point of a reporter who just completed his task of drafting a
politically sensitive restatement, I am confident that given the sharp divisions that
exist in the field, that any attempt to draft a traditional "one-rule-fits-all" restatement
will not work. Any attempt to fuzzy it up with laundry lists of considerations such as
the current section 6 will be useless. One would only add to the list, and any list of
factors would give little guidance to the courts. We already have mush. Little will be
gained by creating slightly more sophisticated mush. What courts need is direction
in implementing the major theoretical approaches that have captured the hearts and
the minds of the scholars. The major themes that the scholars of the various camps
have been championing can be found in the decisions of courts throughout the
78. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 50, at § 6.29; Symeon C. Symeonides, The Needfor
a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 472-74
(2000).
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country. But, they lack direction. A new multi-track restatement could provide real
guidance to the courts.
It is of little solace to say that under the Second Restatement courts seem to come
to the right result most of the time. It has been said that if anyone saw how sausage
was made no one would eat it. Sadly, we watch "conflicts" sausage being made every
day, and it makes the eating very unappetizing. So here's a vote for a third
restatement, one that honestly reflects the differences between the warring schools
and allows the courts to choose between them and then administer their respective
approaches with honesty and integrity.
